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 Honorable Maurice Cohill, Jr., Senior District Judge for the United States District*
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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 All of the plaintiffs are similarly situated in the respects discussed in this and the1
preceding paragraph.  For simplicity, then, the remainder of this opinion will refer only to
Garlick, rather than to “Garlick and her co-appellants” or some equivalent thereof.
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_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Lorie Garlick and her co-appellants appeal from the District Court’s order
dismissing their complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.  We will vacate and remand.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly
summarize the essential facts.
Garlick is a healthcare worker with a history of alcohol abuse.   As part of her1
rehabilitation, she voluntarily submitted to testing designed to convince her medical
licensing board that she no longer drinks alcoholic beverages.  The board used a test that
detects the presence of a substance called ethylglucuronide (EtG) — produced when
alcohol is consumed — in a subject’s urine.  The presence of more than a certain amount
of EtG yields a “positive” result; otherwise the result is “negative” for alcohol
consumption.  One of Garlick’s tests came back positive, and the board disciplined her. 
Garlick, however, claims she has been sober throughout her rehabilitation
5Garlick sued the laboratories that developed the test and the third-party
administrators (TPAs) that collected the specimens and reviewed the results in order to
weed-out false positives.  She does not argue that the test samples were mishandled or
that the test does not accurately detect the presence of EtG.  Rather, she argues that the
test, properly performed, has an unreasonably high likelihood of generating a false
positive for alcohol consumption
Quest Diagnostics Inc. (Quest), one of the laboratories, and its co-appellees moved
to dismiss on the ground that Garlick failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.  The District Court granted the motion, and Garlick filed this appeal.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
The courts of appeals have broad authority to manage cases in ways that maximize
efficiency and fairly vindicate the interests of the parties.  Along these lines, 28 U.S.C. §
2106 provides:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm,
modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court
lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the
entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further
proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.
Particularly relevant here, the courts of appeals have the inherent authority sua sponte to
order a district court to grant a plaintiff leave to amend her complaint where portions of
 We are not holding Garlick to any pleading standard other than that provided in2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).  We merely note that, because Garlick’s claims
appear to be somewhat novel and nuanced, she may, in order to meet that standard, have
to include greater explanatory detail than if she were alleging a mine-run slip-and-fall
injury or some other garden-variety tort based upon a very simple fact pattern.
6
the pleading are less than pellucid in ways that frustrate application of the relevant law. 
See Mittleman v. United States, 104 F.3d 410, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (sua sponte
remanding case to district court with instructions to allow plaintiff to “refine” negligence
and emotional distress claims).
This case calls for the exercise of that authority.  The structure of the complaint is
inherently complex.  Garlick has sued two groups of defendants and makes distinct yet
inter-related negligence claims against each.  And the substance of those claims may raise
issues of first impression in many of the relevant state-law tort regimes.  These features of
the case made it especially important for Garlick to have pleaded her right to relief with
precision.  Yet, the language of the complaint, taken together with the arguments made to
this Court (in the briefs and at oral argument), suggest that she instead took a somewhat
scattershot approach.   2
For example, Garlick claims that the EtG cutoff — separating positive from
negative results — was set arbitrarily.  Thus, determining who set those baselines may be
critical.  The complaint alleges that “Defendants” set the baselines.  Appendix 58 (Compl.
¶ 93(b)).  Garlick’s opening brief explains that this allegation refers to all defendants
acting in concert.  Appellants’ Br. at 18.  Yet, at oral argument, Garlick stated repeatedly
7that the laboratories alone — not the TPAs — set the cutoff.  Garlick effectively concedes
that this lack of precision permeates her pleading.  Her opening appellate brief is littered
with footnotes tacitly admitting that her original complaint is murky in multiple respects
by repeatedly offering to amend her complaint in order to clarify her allegations.  See
Appellants’ Br. at 6 n.2 (“Plaintiffs are able to amend, if it is deemed necessary by this
Court, to clarify this allegation in the instant complaint.”), 8 nn.4 (“Plaintiffs are able to
amend, if it is deemed necessary by this Court, to make this allegation in the instant
complaint.”) & 5 (“Plaintiffs are able to amend, if it is deemed necessary by this Court, to
clarify these allegations in the instant complaint.”), 11 n.6, 21 nn.8 (“If this allegation is
not clearly stated in the complaint it can be made by amendment.”) & 10, 24 n.11.
The sprawling nature of the case before the District Court further muddied the
waters.  Garlick’s complaint included a hodgepodge of seven theories of recovery: 
negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, products liability, breach of
warranty, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the New Jersey Consumer
Fraud Act.  Garlick’s brief represents that five of these seven counts were withdrawn and
that she is not appealing the District Court’s ruling regarding a sixth count.  Appellants’
Br. at 3 n.1.  Garlick is now pursuing only her negligence claim.  We believe that the
District Court should have the first opportunity to resolve this narrower controversy.
To sum up, Garlick’s claims are “not clear enough for us to apply the pertinent
[law],” in this case various bodies of state tort law.  Mittleman, 104 F.3d at 412.  We will
8exercise our discretionary authority to give Garlick the opportunity to “refine [them] into
clear enough terms” such that the District Court may do so in the first instance.  Id. at
417.
III.
For the reasons articulated above, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and
remand the matter to the District Court with instructions to allow Garlick a reasonable
amount of time to amend her complaint.
